INDIA”S 1962 DEBACLE: CLOSURE ONLY POSSIBLE WITH PUNISHMENT OF GUILTY

As a follow up to now- famous letter by Sardar Patel to Nehru about developments in Tibet, a committee was formed under the chairmanship of Brigadier (Later Major General) Himmat Sinhji, Deputy Director General Military Operations in 1950 to study the problems arising as a consequence of the Chinese aggression in Tibet and make necessary recommendations.  In official records this committee was called `North and North East Border Defence Committee’. The committee submitted its report in two parts. The first Part consisting of recommendations regarding Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA and the Eastern frontier bordering Burma was submitted in April, 1951. The second part containing the recommendations on Ladakh and the frontier regions of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Nepal and was submitted in September, 1951. In final report the recommendations were grouped under six heads, namely (1) Administration, (2) Development, (3) Defence and Security which included the Army and the Air Force, (4) the Civil Armed Forces including the Assam Rifles and other police units, (5) Communications, and (6) Intelligence. As per MoD’s submission before the Central Information Commission dated 12 October 2011 the said report is not (NOT) held with it. How convenient! Please note that loss of Himmat Sinhji Report is of crucial importance to ensure that Nehru-Menon-Mullick Troika as also bureaucrats like K Subramanyam and their cohorts in the army of the day are not held accountable for their inexcusable lapses. In 1953 another committee under Major General Kalwant Singh was formed to study purely military aspects arising from Chinese occupation of Tibet. This committee clearly said that Chinese aggression was a distinct certainty in next 5 to 7 years, that is, period 1959 – 1961 and recommended that India should immediatly increase the force levels on Indo – Tibet LAC. Subsequently in 1958 Lieutenant General SPP Thorat, the then Eastern Army Commander, forwarded his considered assessment of likely Chinese attack in Tawang and adjoining areas of NEFA with probable thrust lines and force levels to Army Headquarters. General Thimmaya shared this appreciation with the then Defence Minister and followed up with a visit in 1960 to study Alpine Troops of Europe and on return gave a proposal to the Government of India to immediately raise mountain divisions for Indo – Tibet border. This advice was ignored, mainly due to ideological affinity the then Defence Minister had with China and Nehru’s unsubstantiated belief in good intentions of China. 

For the last 60 years a sustained campaign to malign the Indian Army has been launched by interested parties like K Subramanyam who has been touted as a strategic thinker by media. In 1971 he made disingenuous claim that rather than ignoring the Indian Army during the period 1951 – 1962 Nehru in fact strengthened.  He claimed that during this period Indian Defence budget had risen from around 150 crore to 300 crores and Indian Army strength rose from 3,50,000 in 1951 to 5,50,000 in 1962. Implying that it was a well-equipped army that lost to Chinese. He intentionally suppressed the fact that entire increase of 2,00,000 soldiers as also import of some tanks was meant to fight a rapidly modernising and expanding Pakistan Army and Tibet frontier and Chinese threat were totally ignored by Nehru and his favourite Menon. But he has a reason to suppress the facts! After all he was the Joint Secretary in MoD responsible for acquisitions during much of that period and any serious inquiry into causes for defeat will expose him. What is surprising is that this falsehood has been swallowed hook-line and sinker by even so-called military experts.

Fact is that at the start of conflict in 1962 Indian Army was faced with an overwhelmingly stronger Chinese PLA  with combat ratio of  one Indian to three Chinese. Moreover Chinese troops were well equipped, fully acclimatized, well supported and trained for war in High Altitude Areas. For example India  had one Infantry Brigade in Ladakh against One Division of Chinese which was Headquartered at Rudok.  In North East newly raised HQ IV Corps at Tezpur with only one Infantry Division was facing three divisions of the Chinese. To start with there were no (NO) regular troops to defend Sikkim. To ill-conceived  `Forwards Policy' of Nehru was hastily executed by Troika of Political Generals by pushing the troops, who were trained and equipped to fight in Plains or engaged in counter-insurgency, post-haste to NEFA to fight in High Altitude Areas without any logistic support. Force levels as arrived at by Mandeep Singh Bajwa & Ravi Rikhye  in their note titled: The Indian Army On The Eve Of The 1962 War: A Note v.1.0 February 29, 2008 are tabulated below.

Sector	Indian Army	PLA China
Ladakh,	One Brigade	One Division
Himachal	Punjab Armed Police
Uttrakhand	4 STF UP Police & One Brigade	Two Brigades
North Sikkim	NIL to start with. 20 Infantry Division inducted on 16/11/62	One Brigade
East Sikkim		Two Brigades
NEFA (Arunachal)	4 Infantry Division (a)    Tawang: 7 Brigade (b)   Along and Kameng: 5 Brigade (c)    Darjeeling: 11 Brigade (Later at Kameng)	One Group Army (27 Battalion)
Reserve	NIL	Two Brigades (5 Battalion)

Rest of the Indian Army was located in West or employed on Counter Insurgency tasks.

·         J&K:       XV Corps with three Infantry Divisions (19, 25 and 26) and one Infantry Brigade.

·         Punjab: XI Corps with three Infantry Divisions (5, 7 and 27) and two Infantry Brigades.

·         Rajasthan: Two Infantry Brigades.

·         East:

o   XXXIII Corps with two Infantry Divisions (20 and 23) for Counter Insurgency tasks. One Division, namely 20 was moved to Gangtok, Sikkim on 16 November 1962.

o   IV Corps at Tezpur with one Infantry Division consisting of two brigades against Chinese.

·         Army Reserve: One Armoured Division one Armoured Brigade and one Parachute Brigade.

Clearly No infrastructure development preceded so-called forward policy. Time and again well considered advice of upright and forthright Generals like Himmat Sinhji, Kalwant Singh, SPP Thorat and Thimmaya was intentionally ignored by a self- opinionated Defence Minister Menon who was emotionally and ideologically beholden to Chinese and was fully supported by a Prime Minister who put his personal friendships and preconceived ideas above national interests. These politicians  were egged on by a cabal of bureaucrats like K Subramanyam who as Joint Secretary Acquisitions in MoD was directly responsible for the shortages in necessary arms and ammunition faced by Indian soldier fighting Chinese. At any given time only 10 per cent of Indian Army strength was pitted against the Chinese by a set of political generals like Thapar, Kaul and Dhillion. They collectively led a proud nation to its worst debacle. It is time that we had full disclosures on the subject followed by a thorough inquiry to not only draw lessons but also to apportion blame where it belongs. Without guilty (even postmortem) being punished there can be no closure.